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ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AFTER BERGER
I. THE HISTORY OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
This history of man's attempt to communicate with his fellow man
has been paralleled by another history-that of man's attempt to
overhear this communication. The art of overhearing or eavesdrop-
ping has proceeded on a step-by-step basis with the science of com-
munication. Indeed, the furtive methods of the art have rarely failed
to emulate the sophisticated means of the science. From passive over-
hearing of face-to-face conversation to sanguinary interception of
homing pigeons by domesticated hawks, the progress of interception
vis-a-vis communication has been carried into the twentieth century,
utilizing methods and means beyond the imagination of the inter-
ceptor or eavesdropper of yesterday. It is now possible, by the use of
parabolic microphones to pick up conversations at distances of 500
to 1000 feet.1 Hidden microphones, which receive and transmit every
sound in a room, may be inserted into a telephone receiver and be
operable even when the receiver is on the hook.2 Microphones as thin
as "wafers"3 and as small as sugar cubes4 may now be employed to
listen surreptitiously to private conversations. In the area of wire-
tapping, it is no longer necessary to cut or tap the line directly. A
commentator has recently stated that by placing, near the vicinity of
a telephone, a coil of wire that receives electronic impulses from the
telephonic electromagnetic field, overhearing may easily be accom-
plished without the necessity of cutting any of the telephone lines.5
The potential pervasiveness of these instruments has prompted Pro-
fessor Schwartz in his book entitled The Eavesdroppers to exclaim
that:
To be certain of defense against any eavesdropping of this kind
(and incidentally, against wireless microphones as well,) one should
shield his room completely with a continuous covering of aluminum
foil and substitute for his window glass a special conducing glass
made by several of the large glass companies ... 6
1 See S. DASH, R. ScHwART, & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS, 350 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as EAVESDROPPERS].
2 Id. at 341.
8 JUDICIARY CoMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA SENATE, REPORT ON THE INTERCEPTION OF
MESSAGES BY THE USE OF ELECTRONIC AND OTHER DEvIcEs at 8 (1957).
4 EAVESDROPPERS at 343.
5 Runf4 The Electronic Eavesdropping Threat to the Right of Privacy: Can the
States Help?, 3 IDAHO L. REv. 13 (1966). For other articles treating this subject,
see also: Sullivan, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: A Review of the Current Law, 18
HAST. L. REv. 59 (1966), and Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping: A New Approach,
52 CALIF. L. REv. 142 (1964).
6 EAVESDROPPERS at 353-58.
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This progress of communications-interception has not been without
legal ramification. Recently, in the case of Berger v. New York,7 the
Supreme Court was confronted with a situation that exemplifies the
simultaneous attempt to overhear a conversation and yet remain
within the framework of existing law. To a great extent, the decision
of the Supreme Court in this case rests on the constitutional history of
eavesdropping in the United States. Therefore, before attempting to
analyze the holding in Berger, it would seem appropriate to view
briefly its historical underpinnings.
The development of the law in regard to eavesdropping has
derived impetus from the concept that one's privacy is a protectable
legal interest. In the words of Lord Nathan, it is the privilege "to
shut one's door upon the world and to do or to say what one will...
secure in the knowledge that one is alone."8 Justice Brandeis, dissent-
ing in Olmstead v. United States,9 probably expresses the feelings of
many who have considered the current impact of these two irrecon-
cilable concepts, i.e., privacy and eavesdropping.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, his feelings and of his intellect....
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and sensations. They conferred, as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.10
In the United States, the history of the citizen's desire to maintain
privacy, and the government's use of electronic eavesdropping and
wiretapping to combat crime, has been focused against a background
of constitutional interpretations beginning with the Olmstead case in
1928. Faced with the petitioner's contention that the admission of
evidence obtained by a non-trespassory wiretap was in violation of
the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court held that "search," as
used in the amendment, contemplated a physical entry on the prem-
ises and that the word "seizure" referred to the taking of "material"
things. Since Olmstead, the claim that evidence gathered by means
of wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping violates constitutional
rights has taken varied tacks. It is the purpose of this brief history
to trace these somewhat diverse courses and determine their current
status in the law.
7 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
8 Nathan, Eavesdropping, 225 L.T. 119, 120 (1958).





Seven years after the Olmstead case, Congress passed Section 605
of the Federal Communications Act, which essentially provides that:
[N] o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communi-
cation to any person .... 11
Nardone v. United States'2 provided the Supreme Court with its
first opportunity to construe section 605 as it applied to the admission
of wiretapping evidence in a criminal prosecution. The Court, in
reversing the petitioner's conviction, held that -[t]o recite the con-
tents of the message in testimony before a court is to divulge the
message. The conclusion that the Act forbids such testimony seems
to us unshaken by the government's arguments."'13 At the second
trial,14 the government introduced evidence, derived from leads
which had been uncovered in the original wiretap, again to convict
the petitioner. The Court, on certiorari, citing Silverthorn Lumber
Co. v. United States,"5 held that the use of this derivative evidence
was inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree.""'
In the dichotomous decisions following the second Nardone case,
the Court has given both broad and restrictive interpretations to the
scope of section 605. Leaning toward a somewhat broad interpreta-
tion, the Court held in Weiss v. United States'7 that wiretap evidence,
whether resulting from the interception of interstate or intrastate
messages, was inadmissible in the federal courts. Following Weiss,
the Court, in a more conservative mood, observed that a defendant
who was not a party to a wiretapped conversation had no standing
to invoke the protection of section 605.'8 The decisions in succeeding
cases have continued to follow this same oscillating course.
The 1942 decision of Goldman v. United States'" limited the
protection afforded under section 605, applying it only to wiretapping
and not to non-telephonic electronic eavesdropping. Goldman also
11 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958).
12 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
'3 Id. at 382.
14 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
15 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (evidence gained initially by constitutionally prohibited
methods cannot later be the basis for additional action against a suspect).
16 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. at 341.
17 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
18 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
1t 316 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1942).
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reaffirmed the Olmstead requisite of actual physical trespass to evince
a violation of the fourth amendment. Ten years later, the Court, in
Schwartz v. Texas,20 considered the application of section 605 to the
admissibility of wiretap evidence in state courts, and found nothing
proscriptive in the federal legislation. This decision was based on the
determination that Congress had not expressed an intention to pre-
empt the area. Noteworthy was the Court's indication that section
605 might be enforced by the penal provisions of Section 501 of the
Federal Communications Act,21 which provides for a fine not to
exceed $10,000 and/or imprisonment for a term not to exceed one
year. However, to this date there have apparently been no prosecu-
tions of state law-enforcement officers under this statute.
In more recent opinions,22 the doctrine of federal preemption as
to state wiretap evidence has both increased and ebbed in the Court's
constitutional outlook; yet it has never been explicitly espoused. In
the final analysis, the current status of the law is that a Federal Court
may not enjoin the use in a criminal trial in a state court of evidence
obtained by wiretapping in violation of Section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act.as Consequently, it would seem that the only
viable restraint to the introduction of state wiretap evidence is the
sanction of section 501,4 making the procurement of such evidence
a federal crime. However, as already indicated, there has been no
prosecution to date. This aspect of the law, then, enjoys the somewhat
dubious acclaim of sanctioning a violation of federal law in the
furtherance of state prosecutions. The repercussions created in this
area by Berger v. New York,25 will be seen subsequently.
B. Electronic Eavesdropping
Although Olmstead, as previously noted, involved a non-trespass-
ory wiretap, it is considered the fountainhead from which flowed the
basic concepts of the law in regard to electronic eavesdropping. The
Olmstead rationale, which continues to enjoy vitality, lies in predicat-
ing a violation of the fourth amendment upon a physical trespass or
intrusion into the defendant's property. In the succession of cases
20 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
21 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1959).
22 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d 94
(2d Cir. 1961).
23 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952). See Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S.
458 (1961).
24 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1959).
25 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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following Olmstead, the Court has consistently maintained that non-
trespassory eavesdropping is not per se a violation of the fourth
amendment guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Thus in Goldman v. United States,2" which was the first eaves-
dropping case to follow Olmstead, the Court found that there had
been no violation of the fourth amendment because there had been
no physical trespass. In this case, the federal officers had installed a
listening device outside the office of the defendant and, through it,
had gleaned the necessary information. However, prior to this
external listening, the officers had entered the office of the defendant
and had installed a malfunctioning listening device. The Court ruled
that the initial trespass in entering the defendant's office had not
tainted the evidence because it had not been obtained from the in-
trusion. Since the Court, rather than pursuing the generic background
of the term "unreasonable," chose to define an unreasonable search
and seizure as an intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, the
decisions both before and after Goldman have been fraught with
formalistic distinctions turning on whether a trespass has been com-
mitted. A striking example of this is Hester v. United States,27 where
a federal revenue agent, hiding 50 to 100 feet away on property
belonging to the defendant's father, had seen the defendant coming
out of the father's house in possession of illegal "moonshine." In
response to a claimed violation of the fourth amendment, Justice
Holmes stated that "the special protection accorded by the Fourth
Amendment to people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,'
is not extended to the open fields .... ',28 Although, concededly, the
above example does not involve electronic eavesdropping, it serves
to illustrate the 1924 Court's treatment of trespass or intrusion as
being synonymous with "unreasonable." Consistent with the above
reasoning is the Court's decision in Silverman v. United States.29
In this case, which was the first to decide directly when the fourth
amendment had been violated, the District of Columbia police had
pushed a "spike mike" through the party wall of the house until it
penetrated 5/16 of an inch into the adjoining house of the defendant.
The "spike" had come to rest on a heating duct "thus converting
... the... entire heating system into a conductor of sound."30 The
26 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
27 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
28 Id. at 59.
20 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
ao Id. at 507.
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court of appeals, in affirming the defendant's conviction, deemed that
a fraction of an inch did not appreciably affect the right to privacy.3'
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, stating that the "decision
here does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party
wall as a matter of local law. It is based upon the reality of an actual
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area."
8 2
Although the Court in Silverman appears to have disregarded the
formal distinctions of local law in connection with the concepts of
trespass, the circuit courts have apparently adhered to the require-
ment that the trespass must be appreciable in order to violate the
fourth amendment. 3 The net effect is that the law in electronic eaves-
dropping-unlike the wiretapping area controlled by section 605-
has much broader applicability because it is decided under the fourth
amendment. Due to the Supreme Court's holding in Mapp v. Ohio, 4
the protection of the fourth amendment is extended to the citizens
of the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Therefore, any evidence gathered by means of electronic eaves-
dropping or otherwise, which is violative of the fourth amendment,
is inadmissible in state courts. Since, under the Olmstead doctrine,
trespassory eavesdropping has been held violative of the fourth
amendment, evidence gathered by state officials in this manner would
be inadmissible in state courts under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments.
However, as will be discussed below, the decision in Berger has
added new dimensions to this area so that the crucial distinction in
both federal and state law should no longer be measured in inches.
C. eFace-To-Face" Eavesdropping
Another tack in the pertinent eavesdropping history is represented
by the On Lee-P5 Lopez3 6 Osborn7 trilogy. The distinguishing feature
of these cases is that the eavesdropping-if it can be so termed-
occurred by utilizing a hidden recording device upon the person of
an agent who was engaged in face-to-face conversation with the
81 United States v. Silverman, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
82 365 U.S. 505 at 512 (1961).
83 Anspach v. United States, 305 F.2d 48, 51 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 826 (1962); Todisco v. United States, 298 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 989 (1962); United States v. Kabot, 295 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 803 (1962).
84 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
36 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
37 Osbom v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
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petitioner. The damaging or incriminating statements elicited from
the conversation were later admitted as evidence.
In On Lee v. United States, an "old acquaintance" of the defen-
dant, equipped with a transmitting device, had elicited incriminating
statements regarding narcotics. The Court, in reviewing the testimony
of the agent who had received the transmissions, stated that there
had been no fourth amendment infringement due to the absence of
a trespass. Indeed, said the Court, the "acquaintance" had "entered
a place of business with the consent, if not by the implied invitation of
the [defendant] . . .,,3
Lopez v. United States was set in much the same background as
was On Lee. Lopez was the owner of an inn which was being in-
vestigated by the Internal Revenue Service to determine possible
evasion of an excise tax on cabarets. When he discovered the purpose
of an IRS visit, he invited the agent into his office to "discuss" the
matter. The first meeting culminated in his giving the agent $420
and promising more if the agent would drop the case. Pursuant to an
invitation to return, the agent came back to the scene, but this time
with a hidden pocket wire recorder with which he recorded incrimi-
nating statements. This recording, plus the testimony of the agent,
was substantially the evidence upon which Lopez was convicted in
the lower court. On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the petitioner's
theory was that in view of the agent's falsification of his mission-i.e.,
pretending to accept a bribe while actually recording the petitioner's
remarks-access to the office had been gained by misrepresentation.
Therefore, all evidence obtained in the office as a consequence of the
conversation with the petitioner had been illegally "seized." The
Court rejected this theory by stating that the agent had not been
guilty of an unlawful invasion of petitioner's office simply because
his apparent willingness to accept a bribe had not been real.8 9 Thus,
dismissing any trespass by the agent, the Court went on to character-
ize eavesdropping as those instances "when devices have been used
to enable government agents to overhear conversations which would
have been beyond the reach of the human ear."40 Following this line
of reasoning, it was possible for the Court to conclude with faultless
logic that: "Indeed this case involves no 'eavesdropping' whatever in
any proper sense of that term."41
88 343 U.S. at 751-52 (1952).
39 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 439. For an extremely incisive approach, contrary to that taken by the major-
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The last case in the trilogy-and the Court's latest treatment of
face-to-face eavesdropping--is Osborn v. United States. Osborn, en-
gaged in preparing the defense of James R. Hoffa, who was awaiting
trial upon a criminal charge in the federal court in Nashville, hired
a man named Robert Vick to make background investigations of the
prospective jurors for the Hoffa trial. Unknown to him, Vick had
several times met with federal agents and had agreed to report to
them any "illegal activities" he might observe. During the course of
conversation between Vick and Osborn, Vick mentioned that some of
the members of the panel were known to him and that one of the
members was his cousin. According to Vick, Osborn then requested
that Vick visit his cousin to see what arrangements could be made
concerning the case. After this meeting, Vick reported to federal
agents, who directed him to file a written report under oath. This
sworn statement was shown to two federal district court judges who,
after examining the report, authorized the agents to place a hidden
recording device on the person of Vick so as to determine the veracity
of the statements made in his affidavit.4 2 After another meeting be-
tween Vick and Osborn, which was recorded on the hidden recorder
and in which statements were again made in regard to bribing the
juryman, the action leading to Osborn's conviction was initiated.
In answer to petitioner's claimed violation of fourth amendment
rights with respect to the hidden recorder, the Court held that the
instant case fell within the guidelines of both the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Lopez. The majority opinion in Lopez was easily
complied with, stated the Court, because the elements of the face-to-
face recorded conversations were almost identical. In conforming the
ity in this case, see the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan. The dissent, which is
joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg, stresses that the waiver of trespass relied on
by the majority is at best fictional. It points out that this form of conduct is not merely
face-to-face conversation; rather the hidden microphone amounts to independent evidence
of the conversation and is, therefore, as opprobrious as having a third party listen with-
out the knowledge and consent of the speaker.
The dissent is also noteworthy for the view taken by Justice Brennan wherein he
states that
in any event, it is premature to conclude that no warrant for an electronic
search can possibly be devised. The requirements of the Fourth Amendment are
not inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforce-
ment. It is at least clear that "the procedure of antecedent justification before
a magistrate that is central to the Fourth Amendment" . . . could be made a
precondition of lawful electronic surveillance.
Id. at 464.
385 U.S. 323, 329 n.6 (1966). District Judge Miller, who authorized the use of
the recorder stated -that- "the-tape--recorder should be used under proper surveillance,
supervision, to see that it was not faked in any way, and to take every precaution to
determine that it was used in a fair manner, so that we could get at the bottom of it
and determine what the truth was."
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facts to the standards laid down by the dissenting opinion in Lopez,
the Court emphasized the preciseness and particularity of the warrant
authorizing the recording device and concluded that "[T]here could
hardly be a dearer example of 'the procedure of antecedent justifica-
tion before a magistrate that is central to the Fourth Amendment'
as 'a precondition of lawful electronic surveillance.' "48
In short then, it would seem that the law as to face-to-face elec-
tronic surveillance has undergone little change since the Court's first
treatment of the subject in On Lee. Aside from the fact that a warrant
to authorize such activity has been sustained, the basic concept that
this method of surveillance is not a prohibited form of eavesdropping
enjoys continued vitality.
D. The "tMere Evidence" Doctrine and the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments
In addition to the already-mentioned constitutional contentions,
attacks against government electronic surveillance have been based
on alleged violations of the fifth and sixth amendments, as well as
on the oft-criticized "mere evidence" rule. In Olmstead v. United
States,4 4 the petitioner's claim that electronic surveillance by govern-
ment officers had violated his fifth amendment rights went undecided.
In fact, in most of the eavesdropping-wiretapping cases, a determina-
tion of fifth amendment rights has not been necessary. Indeed, when
the question has arisen,4 5 the Court has held that in light of the
absence of compulsion, i.e., the statements made being wholly volun-
tary, there has been no self-incrimination within the meaning of the
fifth amendment.
Probably the Court's latest pronouncement as to the rights guaran-
teed under the fifth amendment occurred in the case of Hoffa v.
United States,4 6 where the defendant was convicted for attempting
to bribe members of a jury. Substantial information and evidence
had been obtained for the prosecution by a paid government informer,
who throughout the former trial had repeatedly remained in the
defendant's company. In answer to the defendant's claim that his
fifth amendment rights had been violated, the Court held that since
defendant's statements to the informer had been wholly voluntary,
48 Id. at 330.
44 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
45 See Todisco v. United States, 298 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 989 (1962).
46 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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"it [was] clear that no right protected by the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination [had been] violated
in this case." 47 The Court stressed that in order to show a violation
of fifth amendments rights, a defendant must show that the "incrimi-
nating statements were the product of [some] ... sort of coercion,
legal or factual." 48 Thus, unless electronically seized statements are
characterized as being involuntarily elicited, or as the product of
coercion, the Court will apparently not recognize this type of conduct
as violative of the fifth amendment.
In the famed case of Massiah v. United States,49 the Court had
occasion to construe the applicability of the sixth amendment right
to counsel in a situation involving surreptitious eavesdropping. After
the defendant had been indicted and had retained counsel, an agent
of the government engaged him in a conversation and elicited in-
criminating statements. The conversation was monitored by a hidden
transmitter and picked up by another agent who was in a nearby car.
The Court, in denying the admissibility of this testimony, held that
" '[a]ny secret interrogation of the defendant, from and after the
finding of the indictment, without the protection afforded by the
presence of counsel, contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the
conduct of criminal causes and the fundamental rights of persons
charged with crime.' "0
In subsequent cases, 51 the Court has held that the right to counsel
(as well as rights under the fifth amendment) arises when the suspect
has been taken into custody, or his freedom of movement has been
restricted by officers, and the investigation has begun to focus on the
suspect in order to elicit incriminating statements. In short, it would
seem that surreptitious eavesdropping would not be an abridgement
of the sixth amendment, as that amendment has been currently con-
strued, unless that activity takes place either after indictment and
selection of counsel, or after the freedom of movement of the suspect
is inhibited and he is subjected to in-custody interrogation.
Another argument which has occasionally been raised in opposi-
tion to electronic eavesdropping is the "mere evidence" theory, first
47 Id. at 304.
48 Id.
49 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
50 Id. at 205, citing People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448
(1961), and Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 325-26 (1959) (Douglas, S.J.,
concurring).




enunciated in Boyd v. United States."2 Under this theory the govern-
ment could not seize evidence unless it was the fruit or instrumental-
ity of a crime or contraband. Evidence which did not fall into one of
these categories "and [was] sought by the Government for use as
evidence merely [could not] .. .be searched for and seized in the
owner's house or office by resort to a warrant."5 3 After enjoying a
somewhat checkered career, in which the theory was both utilized"
and criticized,55 it came to its final and not undeserved resting place
in Warden v. Hayden."6 In treating the court of appeals' finding that
the seizure and introduction of items of clothing violated the fourth
amendment because they were "mere evidence," the Supreme Court
rejected the distinction between "mere evidence" and properly seiz-
able evidence (i.e., instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband) "as based
on premises no longer accepted as rules governing the application of
the Fourth Amendment."
57
The net effect of this decision, as it applies to eavesdropping, is
that it put an end to what was once a viable argument by opponents
of this means of surveillance. On the other hand, it would seem that
the Court has taken a more rational approach to the problem because
it views the interests protected by the fourth amendment as those of
privacy, and not as one type of evidence over another.
5 8
II. THE BERGER DECISION
In Berger v. New York,59 the Court was faced with a multifaceted
attack on eavesdropping--both generally, as it existed under Section
813-a of New York's Code of Criminal Procedure,60 and specifically,
52 116 U.S. 616 (1885). For another eavesdropping case employing this argument,
see Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 456-57 (1963).
53 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 310 (1921) (emphasis added).
54 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
65 People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 408 P.2d 108, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, cert. denied,
384 U.S. 908 (1965); State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965).
" 387 U.S. 294 (1967). In this case the police were pursuing a man they believed
had committed an armed robbery and entered the suspect's home five minutes after
he allegedly entered. The suspect was found in an upstairs bedroom feigning sleep
and was arrested when the officers determined that he was the only man in the building.
In the meantime, other officers searched the house and found a jacket and trousers of
the type the fleeing man was said to have worn. This clothing was found in the washing
machine.
57 "Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary object
than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband." Id. at 301-02.
58 Id. at 300.
19 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
60 N.Y. Cam. PRo. LAw § 813-a (M1cinney 1958).
An ex parte order for eavesdropping... may be issued by any justice of the
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as it applied to the petitioner. The factual underpinnings of Berger
are substantially as follows.
Having received several complaints charging that Liquor Authority
employees were extracting bribes in return for liquor licenses, the
District Attorney of New York obtained an ex parte order61 to place
an eavesdropping device in the office of one of the suspected con-
spirators. Pursuant to the order, which allowed eavesdropping for 60
days if necessary, agents of the District Attorney entered the office
in the early morning hours and secreted the device. Through leads
supplied from this eavesdrop, a second order was issued and a similar
device placed in another suspect's office. After two weeks of listening
to conversations, a conspiracy was uncovered involving the issuance
of liquor licenses to two New York City dubs. On the strength of
this evidence, the petitioner was indicted as a "go-between" for the
principal conspirators and was subsequently convicted on two counts
of conspiracy to bribe the Chairman of the New York Liquor Author-
ity. The District Attorney conceded that the information obtained by
the eavesdrop was the only evidentiary basis for the prosecution, and,
following petitioner's appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The petitioner's objection to the statute lay in its sanction of
intrusions into constitutionally protected areas, thereby allowing
"general searches," and its infringement of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Regarding his conviction, the
supreme court or judge of a county court or of the court of general sessions
of the county of New York upon oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or
the attorney-general or of an officer above the rank of sergeant of any police
department of the state or of any political subdivision thereof, that there is
reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained and
particularly describing the person or persons whose communications, con-
versations or discussions are to be overheard or recorded and the purpose
thereof, and, in the case of a telegraphic or telephonic communication, identify-
ing the particular telephone number or telegraph line involved. In connection
with the issuance of such an order the justice or judge may examine on oath
the applicant and any other witness he may produce and shall satisfy himself
of the existence of reasonable grounds for the granting of such application.
Any such order shall be effective for the time specified therein but not for a
period of more than two months unless extended or renewed by the justice or
judge who signed and issued the original order upon satisfying himself that
such extension or renewal is in the public interest. Any such order together
with the papers upon which the application was based, shall be delivered to
and retained by the applicant as authority for the eavesdropping authorized
therein. A true copy of such order shall at all times be retained in his posses-
sion by the judge or justice issuing the same, and, in the event of the denial
of an application for such an order, a true copy of the papers upon which the
application was based shall in like manner be retained by the judge or justice
denying the same.
61 An ex parte order is one "taken or granted at instance and for the benefit of
one party only, and without notice to, or contestation by, any person adversely in-
terested." Kimbrough v. Parker, 336 Ill. App. 124,--, 83 N.E.2d 42, 43 (1948).
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petitioner questioned the "probable cause" upon which the warrants
were based, as well as the "probative quality" of the recording intro-
duced in evidence at the trial. In response, the State of New York
asserted the constitutionality of section 813-a by assailing the claim
that eavesdropping searches were "general," and hence violative of
the Constitution because the warrants prescribing them were neces-
sarily incapable of particularity. Additionally, the State maintained
that there was probable cause for the issuance of the warrant and
characterized eavesdropping as an "indispensable adjunct of society's
obligation to discover evidence of crime."' 2 Finally, the State argued
that while eavesdropping was a "distasteful method for the acquisi-
tion of evidence," it was "no different in kind from a variety of con-
ventional and long-sanctioned intrusions into peoples' private lives
and affairs." 63
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Clark, found that the
indiscriminate use of eavesdropping evidence permitted "general
searches" under the statute in violation of the fourth amendment."4
This conclusion was compelled because the statute authorized eaves-
dropping "without requiring belief that any particular offense has
been or is being committed [and without requiring] ...that the
'property' sought, the conversations, be particularly described."' 5 The
Court further found constitutionally offensive the provision of the
statute that allowed continuous eavesdropping for a two-month
period. The statute, so held the Court, prescribed the equivalent of a
62 Brief for Respondent at 69.
683 Id. at 68. The long-sanctioned intrusions mentioned by the respondent include
the "search by warrant, the subpoena's command [and] ... persistent visual surveillance
.... " Id. at 65. Both parties also raised claims with regard to the immunity of "mere
evidence" from search and seizure. The Court however, affirmed its earlier decision in
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), which struck down the prior immunity of
"mere evidence" from search and seizure.
64 Although the statute interposed a "neutral and detached authority between the
police and the public," 388 U.S. at 54, citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948), it was found constitutionally offensive on the ground that it failed to provide
"adequate supervision" or "protective procedures."
65 388 U.S. at 58-59. The purpose of the fourth amendment in this regard is to keep
the government out of constitutionally protected areas until there is probable cause to
believe that a specific crime will be or has been committed. Consequently, if the con-
versations are not sufficiently described, the officer is given a "roving commission to
'seize' any and all conversations." Id. at 59. The effect of the requirement of the New
York statute, that, "the person or persons whose communications, conversations or
discussions are to be overheard or recorded," and the purpose thereof, was in the
opinion of the Court, to "no more than identify the person whose constitutionally
protected area is to be invaded ...." Id. The Court further stated that "'[a]s to what
is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.'"
Id. at 58, citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192,196 (1927).
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"series of intrusions, searches and seizures pursuant to a single show-
ing of probable cause." 6 Additional objections to this provision of
the statute stemmed from its avoiding prompt execution of the war-
rant, its sanctioning indiscriminate seizures of conversations of "any
and all persons coming into the area covered by the [eavesdropping]
device...,,6 7 and its extending the original two-month period on a
"mere showing that such extension is 'in the public interest.' "8
The Court also found that the failure of the statute to provide a
termination date for the eavesdrop resulted in the executing officer's
having too much discretion in determining the length and scope of
the search.6 9 Presumably this objection was directed at the situation
in which an eavesdrop is continued by the officer after the desired
conversation is overheard, in order to gain further information.
Moreover, the failure of the statute to provide for notice to the
subject in the manner of conventional warrants0 was not overcome
by recognition that secrecy was necessary in eavesdropping. In so
holding, the Court stated that the "inherent dangers" of eavesdrop-
ping necessitate a strict construction of the notice requirement in
search warrants which is avoidable only by evincing "exigent cir-
cumstances."71 Lastly, the Court deemed that the statute's failure to
66 388 U.S. at 59.
IN Id.
68 Id.
69 "TIhe statute places no termination date on the eavesdrop once the conversation
sought is seized. This is left entirely in the discretion of the officer." Id. at 59.60.
70 E.g., "As in the making of an arrest an officer refused admittance, after notice
of his authority and purpose by virtue of the warrant, may break into the place to be
searched or any part thereof and carry out the orders in the warrant." C. FRICKE & A.
ALARCON, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 56 (7th ed. 1967) (emphasis added).
See also CAL. PEN. CODE § 1531 (West 1956) which provides that: "ETIhe officer
[may enter forcibly] . . . to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and
purpose, he is refused admittance." (emphasis added). For a further example of this
general concept see L. KOLBREK & G. PORTER, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE 347 (1967) which in explaining search warrant procedure generally states:
Within ten days of the warrant being signed, the officer named in the warrant
takes the original and one copy of the warrant and affidavit to the premises to
be searched, shows the original to the person in charge of the premises and
gives him a copy, and conducts the search.
71 388 U.S. at 89. In his dissent, Justice Black attacks the purpose of this qualifica-
tion by the Court:
Finally, the Court makes the fantastic suggestion that the eavesdroppet
must give notice to the person whose conversation is to be overheard or that
the eavesdropper must show "exigent circumstances" before he can perform
his eavesdrop without consent. Now, if never before, the Court's purpose is
clear: it is determined to ban all eavesdropping. AS the Court recognizes,
eavesdropping "necessarily . . . depends on secrecy." Since secrecy is an
essential, indeed a definitional, element of eavesdropping, when the Court
says there shall be no eavesdropping without notice, the Court means to in-
form the Nation there shall be no eavesdropping-period.
Id. at 86.
NOTES
provide for a return on the warrant vested in the executing officer
excessive discretion in the use of the seized conversations of innocent
as well as guilty parties.72 Although not articulated by the Court,
it would seem that the purpose of the return on the warrant7 3 is to
ensure that evidence discovered beyond the scope of the warrant will
not be used by the prosecuting officials. The effect of these objection-
able provisions was summarized by the Court as a "blanket grant of
permission to eavesdrop ...without adequate judicial supervision
or protective procedures." '74
The Court gave considerable attention to its earlier decision in
Osborn v. United States,75 where an order that allowed eavesdropping
was upheld as having "precise and discriminate" procedures76 which
satisfied the fourth amendment requirements in a face-to-face 77 eaves-
drop.
Osborn's influence on Berger is clearly significant; yet the question
remains as to the effect of Berger on the entire area of electronic
surveillance. Before this effect can be accurately estimated, however,
the decision's limitations should be briefly noted. The Court did not
decide whether the term "reasonable ground," as found in the New
This note interprets the holding to require only some showing of circumstances
rendering the use of electronic surveillance necessary in the sense that conventional
methods of search and seizure would be ineffective against the particular crime or the
particular parties.
72 388 U.S. at 60.
73 For a brief discussion of the mechanics of a return on a warrant see R. DAVIS,
FEDERAL SEARuCHES AND SEIZURES 86-87 (1964), and L. KOLBREK & G. PORTER,
supra note 70, at 347. See also CAL. PEN. CODE § 1537 (West Supp. 1966) for an
example of a statutory return provision.
74 388 U.S. at 60.
75 385 U.S. 323 (1966). For a discussion of the facts of this case see the text
following note 41 supra.
76 The Court described these procedures in the following way:
Among other safeguards, the order described the type of conversation sought
with particularity, thus indicating the specific objective of the Government in
entering the constitutionally protected area and the limitations placed upon the
officer executing the warrant. Under it the officer could not search unauthorized
areas; likewise, once the property sought, and for which the order was issued,
was found the officer could not use the order as a passkey to further search.
In addition, the order authorized one limited intrusion rather than a series or a
continuous surveillance. And, we note that a new order was issued when the
officer sought to resume the search and probable cause was shown for the
succeeding one. Moreover, the order was executed by the officer with dispatch,
not over a prolonged and extended period. In this manner no greater invasion
of privacy was permitted than was necessary under the circumstances. Finally
the officer was required to and did make a return on the order showing how it
was executed and what was seized. Through these strict precautions the danger
of an unlawful search and seizure was minimized.
388 U.S. at 57.
77 For a discussion of the concept of "face-to-face" eavesdropping see the text
accompanying notes 35-43 supra.
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York statute was equivalent to the "probable cause" wording of the
fourth amendment. This problem was circumvented by a finding that
the statute was "deficient on its face in other respects."78s Furthermore
the decision was not supported by a right to privacy arising from the
penumbras of the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments; rather,
it was based on the fourth amendment alone and applied to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.70
Although the Court was primarily concerned with the fourth
amendment as it applied to the New York statute, the implications
of its decision indicate ramifications beyond the sphere of the prin-
cipal case. In its narrowest aspect, the decision merely invalidates a
statute which would license what is otherwise a trespass into a consti-
tutionally protected area. However, Justice Clark's treatment of the
Olmstead80 and Silverman"' cases is indicative of an attempt to in-
dude within the purview of the fourth amendment those searches by
electronic instruments which do not physically breach the dose. In
discussing the Olmstead holding, emphasis was placed more upon the
object of the search (conversation) than upon the place where the
search was conducted. This change in emphasis is illustrated in the
following Berger reference to Olmstead:
Statements in the opinion that a conversation passing over a tele-
phone wire cannot be said to come within the Fourth Amendment's
enumeration of "persons, houses, papers, and effects" have been
negated by our subsequent cases .... They found "conversations"
was within the Fourth Amendment's protections, and the use of
electronic devices to capture it was a "search" within the meaning
of the Amendment, and we so hold.82
Similarly, the Berger Court focused upon that part of the decision in
Silverman that underscored the intrusional nature of the search, as
distinguished from the penetration of the instrument effecting it. a
This suggestion-that the Court has turned its attention more toward
privacy in its generic sense than toward the narrower approach of
78 388 U.S. at 55.
79 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
80 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See the discussion of this case at the text following note 10
supra.
81 365 U.S. 505 (1961). This case is discussed in the text accompanying note 29
supra.
82 388 U.S. at 51.
83 "Significantly, the Court Ei Silverman] held that its decision did 'not turn upon
the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as a matter of local law. It is based upon
the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.'" 388 U.S. at
52, citing 365 U.S. at 512.
[Vol. 5
NOTES
delimiting a constitutionally protected area-is further borne out by
the Court's answer to New York's suggestion as to the necessity of
electronic eavesdropping for crime prevention:
In any event we cannot forgive the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment in the name of law enforcement.... [I] t is not asking
too much that officers be required to comply with the basic command
of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost secrets of one's
home or office are invaded. Few threats to liberty exist which are
greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices.84
It must be noted that nowhere was a distinction drawn between eaves-
dropping accomplished by breaking the close and non-penetrating
eavesdropping.
Whether the Court's broadened implications concerning the scope
of the fourth amendment result in a definitive decision may depend
upon the case of Katz v. United States, 5 to be decided this term.
While investigating the defendant, federal agents placed an elec-
tronic device outside two telephone booths frequently used by him.
Through the use of this equipment, information was obtained indi-
cating the defendant's receipt and transmission of illegal wagering
information. Recordings of these telephone conversations were intro-
duced in evidence at the trial that resulted in conviction. Among the
other authorities relied upon for reversal in defendant's brief, Berger
is cited as enunciating the rule that a violation of the fourth amend-
ment right to privacy may occur without a physical trespass.
Should the outcome of the Katz case be consistent with the implica-
tions in Berger-implications that suggest a closer look at privacy,
and indicate a wilingness to disregard the older concept of trespass-
then some type of warrant similar to that upheld in Osborn will be
necessary if the privacy of the individual is to be maintained in a
manner consistent with the fourth amendment.
A. Projected Guidelines
In addition to its effect on the right of privacy, Berger provided the
Court with the opportunity to classify wiretapping as a form of eaves-
dropping, bringing it within the purview of the fourth amendment.
86
84 388 U.s. at 62, 63.
85 369 F.2d 130 (1966), cert. granted, 386 U.S. 954 (1967). See Postscript infra.
80 "The telephone brought on a new and more modem eavesdropper known as the
'wiretapper."' 388 U.S. at 46. The remaining portion of the majority decision is cast in
terms of "eavesdropping," which would appear, by implication and the preceeding
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Furthermore, by delineating that which was lacking in the New York
statute, the Court, by implication, may have propounded what it con-
sidered to be prerequisites of valid legislation. Restating affirmatively
what the Berger Court stated negatively" produces the following
guidelines: As required by the fourth amendment, the order must
follow a showing of "probable cause" for belief that a crime has
been, is being, or is about to be committed. The order must state with
particularity the "place to be searched" and the "thing" (conversa-
tion) to be seized. It must be promptly executed, and any extension
must be based upon a new showing of probable cause. In addition to
a termination date, the order must follow a showing of "special facts
or circumstances" to warrant the waiving of notice to the subject and
to allow secret execution of the order. And finally, it must provide
for a return on the warrant by the executing officer, and must vest in
the court control of the use of the "seized" conversations. s8
The above guidelines for a valid statute are postulated in response
to perhaps the most significant question raised by Berger: Does the
decision by implication ban all electronic surveillance? The answer
of the majority is inconclusive.
It is said that neither a warrant nor a statute authorizing eaves-
dropping can be drawn so as to meet the Fourth Amendment's re-
quirements. If that be true then the "fruits" of eavesdropping
devices are barred under the Amendment. On the other hand this
Court has in the past, under specific conditions and circumstances,
sustained the use of eavesdropping devices.89
quote, to incorporate the term "wiretapping" within its aegis. Additionally, concurring
and dissenting members of the Court speak in the following terms:
I join the opinion of the Court because at long last it overrules sub silentio
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, and its offspring and brings wire-
tapping and other electronic eavesdropping fully within the purview of the
Fourth Amendment.
388 U.S. at 64 (Douglas, J. concurring).
Today's majority does not, in so many words, hold that all wiretapping and
eavesdropping are constitutionally impermissible. But by transparent indirection
it achieves practically the same result by striking down the New York statute
and imposing a series of requirements for legalized electronic surveillance that
will be almost impossible to satisfy.
388 U.S. at 113 (White, J. dissenting) (emphasis added). The significance of the
amalgamation of eavesdropping and wiretapping is directly related to the prior
divergence of the two terms under the Communications Act of 1934. See the section
on wiretapping in the text accompanying notes 11-25 supra.
87 The validity of the-transition from negative constitutional objections to positive
constitutional guidelines hinges on the assumption that electronic surveillance is possible
under the, fourth amendment. This assumption is tested in the text accompanying notes
94-99 infra.
88 388 U.S. at 58-60.
89 Id. at 65.
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The dissenting members of the Court however fail to share this
equivocation, 0 and are for the most part convinced that the majority
has by implication rendered electronic surveillance constitutionally
impossible. Although the dissent's proposition that Berger has banned
all eavesdropping, may or may not be correct, it is possible to deter-
mine the effect of this decision and its guidelines on existing state
statutes purporting to authorize eavesdroppingY1
B. Fourth Amendment Considerations
In addition to New York, six states having statutes specifically
covering eavesdropping at the time of Berger were California,
Nevada, Oregon, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Maryland. All save
IllinoisP2 allowed for eavesdropping by law enforcement officers;
thus, all but Illinois should be reexamined9 3 in the light of Berger.
In considering the application of the Berger guidelines to the eaves-
dropping statutes now in existence, some comparison must be made
between the guidelines themselves and the manner in which they are
to be applied. It is dear that a statute can sufficiently require probable
cause for belief that a certain crime has or is about to occur. It is
equally clear that provisions covering the requirements of prompt
execution, termination date, special circumstance, and return on the
warrant can be formulated with relative ease. This conclusion follows
from the fact that in each of these instances, electronic surveillance
90 [W]hile the Court faintly intimates to the contrary, it seems obvious to me
that its holding, by creating obstacles that cannot be overcome, makes it com-
pletely impossible for the State or Federal Government ever to have a valid
eavesdropping statute.
388 U.S. at 71 (Black, J. dissenting).
Despite the fact that the use of electronic eavesdropping devices as instru-
ments of criminal law enforcement is currently being comprehensively ad-
dressed by the Congress and various other bodies in the country, the Court
has chosen, quite unnecessarily, to decide this case in a manner which will
seriously restrict, if not entirely thwart, such efforts, and will freeze further
progress in this field, except as the Court may itself act or a Constitutional
Amendment may set things right.
Id. at 89, 90 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
91 The limitation of the discussion to those statutes purporting to authorize eaves-
dropping, as opposed to those purporting to authorize only wiretapping, is due to the
large number of statutes in the latter class. If the synonoymy of the two terms as
postulated in note 86 supra is correct, the wiretapping statutes lend themselves to
similar analysis. The wiretapping statutes now in existence in the United States, as well
as recent federal regulation in the area are listed in 388 U.S. at 47, 48 nn.4 & 5.
92 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 14-1 to 14-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966).
93 If, as the dissenting opinions in Berger suggest, the decision completely pre-
cludes electronic surveillance, the Illinois statute, with its blanket exclusion, is the only
one now satisfactory in the area. If, on the other hand, electronic surveillance under
strict guidelines is both permissable and possible, Illinois has gone further than neces-
sary under the Constitution and could, if it so chose, enact less restrictive legislation.
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presents a picture no different from that found in a traditional search
and seizure situation.
The requirement of particularity, however, is unique. Under the
mandate of the fourth amendment, "no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the things to be seized .... 104
In applying this standard to the search and seizure of conversations,
two objections can be raised-first, particularity in the description of
conversation is impossible, and second, even if it were possible, the
specific warrant procedure is insufficient because it fails to describe
adequately "the things to be seized." The first of these objections must
be examined before the second, since if conversations are found in-
capable of sufficient particular description, consideration of the second
objection is unnecessary.
The Court in Berger refers to conversations as the "'property '
sought," and requires that it be "particularly described."95 Whether
conversations can be particularly described depends to a great extent
upon the interpretation of the terms "search" and "seizure," as found
in the amendment and as applied to conversation. If a "search" occurs
when a conversation is recorded, it necessarily encompasses the con-
versation's entire substantive content, rendering itself subject to the
claim that, as a search, it is unconstitutionally general.Y0 To allay this
claim the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment must be
construed so as to necessitate description only of the parties and the
topic sought in their conversation, not the impossible description of
the specific time in which the topic will arise in the conversationT
94 U.S. CoNST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
95 388 U.S. at 58, 59.
96 The respondent in Berger attacked this claim in the following way:
[I]t is argued that an eavesdropping warrant is incapable of "particularly
describing the * * * things to be seized," since only the general nature of
the discussions are known in advance. This claim, however, is rebutted by
analogous search warrant decisions.
There are inherent limits on particularity in the description of evidence not
yet in hand, whether it be verbal or tangible. But this failure of precognition
should no more vitiate an eavesdrop order than it destroys a search warrant.
And warrants describing "intoxicating liquors" without stating the type, or
"narcotic drugs" without naming the specific drug, or "gambling paraphernalia"
without attaching an inventory have all been deemed sufficient [see, Stan-
ford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 486 (1965); People v. Alontanaro, 34 Misc. 2d
623 (Kings Co. 1962); Johnson v. United States, 46 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1931);
Calo v. United States, 338 F.2d 793 (1st Cir. 1923)].
Brief for Respondent at 50-51.
97 E.g., it is possible for a warrant to describe "discussions between X and Y con-
cerning the Betmore Bookie Syndicate, occuring in Y's office (within the maximum
permissable time limit)" but not "discussions occuring on December 15 between X
and Y in Y's office concerning the Betmore Bookie Syndicate, beginning at 2:31 p.m.
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A similar problem exists in applying the term "seizure" to elec-
tronic surveillance. If seizure occurs at the recording or overhearing
of a conversation,98 the entire conversation is seized. The warrant,
however, is presumably directed only at one part of the conversation.
Therefore, to avoid a general seizure, it is necessary either to construe
the term as denoting only the subsequent use of the conversation in
investigation or prosecution, 9 or to relax the particularity require-
and ending at 2:46 p.m. but not including 2:43 p.m. when they will mention their
golf game." Not only is such particularity impossible, but there currently exists no
device that could operate in such a selective manner.
98 "Recording an innocent conversation is no more a 'seizure' than occurs when the
policeman personally overhears conversation while conducting a warranted search."
388 U.S. at 108 n.1 (White, J. dissenting). The majority, however, speaks in terms
which appear to synonymize recording and "seizure":
During such a long and continuous (24 hours a day) period the conversations
of any and all persons coming into the area covered by the device will be
seized indiscriminately and without regard to their connection with the crime
under investigation.
Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
09 The respondent in Berger raised a similar interpretation of the equality of"seizure" and "use." Basically, the argument rests upon a differentiation of the func-
tions of "search" and "seizure" in a warrant directed at intangibles.
The distinction between search and seizure is readily apparent in the case
of tangibles, and it holds by analogy in the more difficult area of intangibles
as well. The search is the process of looking for the thing to be seized; the
seizure is the reduction of that object to physical possession. It should there-
fore be clear at the outset that seizure cannot be equated with perception.
Perception is the hallmark of a search, which is necessarily broader than a
seizure. Were mere apprehension by the senses deemed a seizure, virtually all
searches would be condemned as too general. Indiscriminate perception char-
acterizes the search; selective acquisition distinguishes the seizure. As optic
observation cannot be considered a seizure, neither can the act of listening,
for "a man searches when he looks and listens" [On Lee v. United States, 193
F.2d 306, 313 (2d Cir. 1951); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. at 459, opin.
of Justice Brennan; District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 18 (D.C.
Cir. 1949), affid 339 U.S. 1 (1950)].
Brief for Respondent at 53-54.
Berger further argued that since overhearing does not constitute a seizure, a mere
recording of what is perceived could equally not constitute a seizure. The respondent
also drew analogies to photographs and inventories in customary searches, and the
fact that they are not regarded as seizures. Having decided what is not seizure, the
respondent asked the following:
Recognizing the distinction between search and seizure of intangibles, the
question remains: when does a seizure of spoken words occur? Can a point
be fixed where the seizure's essential feature of selectivity can operate? The
clue to resolution is provided by cases dealing with tangible evidence which
is seen, but not physically possessed [see, Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.
624, 629 (1946); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920); McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1955); Williams
v. United States, 263 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959)]. Those cases noted that there
is no distinction between physically taking the objects and introducing testi-
mony relating to them in court, or in using them as "leads" to other evidence.
Thus, in addition to physical seizure, a constructive seizure of tangibles may
occur by virtue of their use.
By the same logic, reception of oral evidence-incapable of physical posses-
sion-amounts to a seizure only when use is made of conversations. And so
viewed, the seizure is impermissibly general only if the use extends beyond
conversations specified in the warrant.
Id. at 54-55.
1968]
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ments in the seizure of conversations. In light of the additional
Berger safeguards limiting the use of the seized conversations, namely
prompt execution, termination date, special circumstances, and return
on the warrant requirements, either of these interpretations may now
be justified under the fourth amendment. In the Berger opinion,
Justice Clark, commenting on the Osborn order, came to a similar
conclusion: "[T]hrough these strict precautions the danger of an
unlawful search and seizure was minimized."'100
Some clarification of these terms is necessary before the future of
electronic surveillance can be determined. If the requirements of
particularity are interpreted to allow this type of surveillance, it will
be necessary to examine the statutes in order to ascertain whether they
possess those other safeguards which would allow the liberal con-
struction of "particularity" under the fourth amendment.
C. Application to State Statutes
In examining the state statutes specifically, it should be noted that
three, Nevada, Oregon, and Massachusetts, utilize the term "reason-
able grounds" for belief that a crime is being, has been, or is about
to be committed. The New York statute used this terminology, and
while the Court declined to determine its constitutionality, finding
the statute invalid on other grounds, it did indicate that "[s]uch a
requirement raises a serious probable cause issue under the Fourth
Amendment."''1 1 Insofar as the validity of the statutes is concerned,
this issue need not be resolved here, since they, like the New York
statute, are invalid on other grounds.
California
Shortly after the Berger decision was handed down, California
enacted new legislation in the area of electronic surveillance. At the
time of the decision, however, the then-existing law did not fare well
under the application of the Berger guidelines. Sections 653h-j
10 2 of
the Penal Code were rendered defective by the decision since they
failed to interpose a "neutral and detached" authority between the
police and the public by allowing either a supervising police officer
100 388 U.S. at 57.
101 Id. at 54, 55.
102 Act of May 31, 1941, ch. 525, § 1 [1941] Cal. Stats. 1833 (§ 653h, repealed
1967); Act of July 6, 1957, ch. 1879 § 1 (1957] Cal. Stats. 3285 (§ 653i, repealed




or a district attorney to authorize the placement of the devices. Addi-
tionally, these provisions failed to provide criteria as to the probable
cause, particularity, prompt execution, termination date, special facts,
and return requirements of Berger. Consequently, they were virtually
without safeguard.
The new legislation, enacted two months after Berger, formally
repealed sections 653h-j ;13 the change, however, was primarily one
of form, as the wording of the erstwhile sections are incorporated in
substance in California Penal Code Sections 630 to 633.1°4
The basic purpose of the new provisions is stated in section 630,
where the legislature proclaims that
[the] increasing use of [eavesdropping] ... has created a serious
threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and cannot be tol-
erated in a free and civilized society.
The Legislature by this chapter intends to protect the right of
privacy of the people of this state [while recognizing] ... that law
enforcement agencies have a legitimate need to employ modern
listening devices and techniques in the investigation of criminal
conduct and the apprehension of lawbreakers. Therefore, it is not
the intent of the Legislature to place greater restraints on the use
of listening devices and techniques by law enforcement agencies
than existed prior to the effective date of this chapter.105
Having stated its objective, the legislature enacted sections 631 and
632, which proscribe wiretapping and eavesdropping by "any person,"
including those individuals who act for or on behalf of the govern-
ment.106 This reference to government officers is, however, qualified
by section 633, which provides that
[n]othing in Section 631 or 632 shall be construed as prohibiting
the Attorney General, any district attorney [or their assistants or any
law enforcement officer] ... acting within the scope of his authority,
from overhearing or recording any communication which they could
lawfully overhear or record prior to the effective date of this
chapter. 07
Prior to the recent legislation, California officials could lawfully
eavesdrop pursuant to section 653h. This repealed statute, while im-
103 CAL. PEN. CODE § 620 (West Supp. 1967).
104 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 630-633 (West Supp. 1967).
105 CAL. PEN. CODE § 630 (West Supp. 1967).
108 CAL. PEN. CODE § 632(b) (West Supp. 1967). The term "person" includes
"an individual acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any government or sub-
division thereof, whether federal, state, or local ... 
107 CAL. PEN. CODE § 633 (West Supp. 1967).
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posing criminal liability for electronic eavesdropping, carved out an
exception for law enforcement officers, who could use and install
recording devices when "authorized... by the [heads of'their offices
or departments] ...or by a district attorney, when such use and
installation [were] necessary in the performance of their duties in
detecting crime and in the apprehension of criminals." 10 8
The terminology of the new section 633 would then appear to
sanction police electronic surveillance by relating back to the repealed
statutory wording of section 653h, a confusing legislative procedure
at best, even when the same grant of power can be gleaned from a
reading of the new sections. Thus, it can be ascertained that the new
legislation in California, by incorporating the substance of the re-
pealed sections and by failing to heed the Berger guidelines, continues
the unconstitutional mode of its predecessor.
Nevada
While Nevada's permissive ex parte court procedure for electronic
search' 09 interposes a neutral and detached authority between the
police and the public, it fails to provide other necessary safeguards.
108 Act of May 31, 1941, ch. 525, § 1 [1941] Cal. Stats. 1833 (repealed 1967).
109 NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 200.660-200.680 (1963):
§ 200.660 Court order for interception: Contents of application; effective
period; renewals.
1. An ex parte order for the interception of wire or radio communications
or private conversations may be issued by the judge of the district court or of
the supreme court upon application of a district attorney or of the attorney
general setting forth fully the facts and circumstances upon which the applica-
tion is based and stating that:
(a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the crime of murder,
kidnapping, extortion, bribery or crime endangering the national defense
or a violation of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act has been. committed or
is about to be committed; and
(b) There are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be
obtained essential to the solution of such crime or which may enable the
prevention of such crime; and
(c) No other means are readily available for obtaining such evidence.
2. Where statements in the application are solely upon the information or
belief of the applicant, the precise source of the information and the grounds
for the belief must be given.
3. The applicant must state whether any prior application has been made to
'intercept privat6 conversations or wire or radio communications on the same
communication facilities.or of, from or to the same person, and, if such prior
application exists, the applicant shall disclose the current status thereof.
- 4. The application and any order issued under this section shall identify
fully the particular communication facilities on which the applicant proposes
to make the interception and the purpose of such interception.
5. The court may examine, upon oath or affirmation, the applicant and any
witness the applicant desires to produce or the court requires to be produced.
6. Orders issued under this section shall not be effective for a period longer
than 60 days, after which period the court which issued the order may, upon
application of the officer who secured the original order, in its discretion,
renew or continue the order for an additional period not to exceed 60 days.
All further renewals thereafter shall be for a period not to exceed 30 days.
NOTES
The statute is devoid of a sufficient particularity requirement, calling
only for a description of the "particular communication facilities"
through which the interception is to be effected and for the "purpose"
of the interception.110 The sixty-day period allowed for execution plus
the extension periods provided are dearly insufficient for the required
prompt execution of the warrant as they strongly resemble the New
York provisions. Furthermore, there are no "termination date" or
"return on the warrant" requirements."1 Thus, while the statute may
satisfy the "special circumstances" requisite, it must still be deemed
unconstitutional in omitting a provision for particularity, prompt
execution, termination, and return on the warrant.
Oregon
An ex parte court order procedure for permissive electronic search
is also prescribed in Oregon."' The state statute covers special
§ 200.670 Application for order, documents, testimony confidential; dis-
closure of information prohibited.
1. During the effective period of any order issued pursuant to NRS 200.660,
or any extension thereof, the application for any order under NRS 200.660
and any supporting documents, testimony or proceedings in connection there-
with shall remain confidential and in the custody of the court, and such
materials shall not be released nor shall any information concerning them be
disclosed in any manner except upon written order of the court.
2. No person shall disclose any information obtained by reason of an order
issued under NRS 200.660, except for the purpose of obtaining evidence for
the solution or prevention of a crime enumerated in NRS 200.660, or for the
prosecution of persons accused thereof, unless such information has become a
matter of public record in a criminal action as provided in NRS 200.680.
§ 200.680 Admissibility of information in evidence.
2. Any information obtained, either directly or indirectly, pursuant to an
effective order issued under NRS 200.660 shall not be admissible in any
action except:
(a) It shall be admissible in criminal actions involving crimes enum-
erated in NRS 200.660 in accordance with rules of evidence in criminal
cases; and
(b) In proceedings before a grand jury involving crimes enumerated
in NRS 200.660.
§ 200.690 Penalties.
Any person who willfully and knowingly violates NRS . . . 200.670 shall
be guilty of a felony.
1o NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.660(4) (1963). In the area of specific identification of
the crime at which the order is directed, § 200.660(1) (a) limits application of the
statute to certain crimes enumerated in note 109 supra, and requires the judge to be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that one of them has been or is
about to be committed. While this provision may satisfy the specificity of the crime
requirements in Berger, see the text accompanying note 65 supra, it is doubtful whether
the "particular communication facility" provision of the Nevada statute adequately
covers in all cases the particular description of the place of the search requirement of
the fourth amendment. Note also that nowhere does the statute require the identification
of the parties upon whom the eavesdrop is directed, unless it exists by implication in
*the special circumstances provision of § 200.660(1) (c).
111 But see NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 200.670(2) and 200.680(2) (1963) which have
limited functions in this area, note 109 supra.
112 ORE. REv. STAT. § 141.720-141.740 (1963):
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facts, 113 particularity and prompt execution 114 in a manner similar
to that in the Nevada statute. Consequently, these provisions suffer
the same fate as Nevada's, the former being satisfactory, the latter
§ 141.720 Order for interception of telecommunications, radio communi-
cations or conversations. (1) An ex parte order for the interception of tele-
communications, radio communications or conversations, may be issued by any
judge of a circuit or district court upon verified application of a district attorney
setting forth fully the facts and circumstances upon which the application is
based and stating that:
(a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime directly and
immediately affecting the safety of human life or the national security
has been committed or is about to be committed.
(b) There are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be
obtained essential to the solution of such crime, or which may enable the
prevention of such crime.
(c) There are no other means readily available for obtaining such
information.
(2) Where statements are solely upon the information and belief of the
applicant, the precise source of the information and the grounds for the belief
must be given.
(3) The applicant must state whether any prior application has been made
to obtain telecommunications, radio communications or conversations on the
same instrument or from the person and, if such prior application exists, the
applicant shall disclose the current status thereof.
(4) The application and any oder issued under this section shall identify
fully the particular telephone or telegraph line, or other telecommunication or
radio communication carrier or channel from which the information is to be
obtained and the purpose thereof.
(5) The court shall examine upon oath or affirmation the applicant and
any witness the applicant desires to produce or the court requires to be pro-
duced.
(6) Orders issued under this section shall not be effective for a period
longer than 60 days, after which period the court which issued the warrant
or order may, upon application of the officer who secured the original warrant
by application, in its discretion, renew or continue the order for an additional
period not to exceed 60 days. All further renewals thereafter shall be for a
period not to exceed 30 days.
§ 141.730 Proceeding under expired order prohibited. Any officer who
knowingly proceeds under an order which has expired and has not been
renewed as provided in ORS 141.720 is deemed to act without authority under
ORS 141.720 and shall be subject to the penalties provided ... as though he
had never obtained any such order or warrant.
§ 141.740 Records confidential. The application for any order under ORS
141.720 and any supporting documents and testimony in connection therewith
shall remain confidential in the custody of the court, and these materials shall
not be released or information concerning them in any manner disclosed except
upon written order of the court. No person having custody of any records
maintained under ORS 141.720 to 141.740 shall disclose or release any
materials or information contained therein except upon written order of the
court.
118 ORE. REV. STAT. § 141.720(1) (b), (c) (1963).
114 With regard to the particularity requirement of Berger, Oregon calls only for
the indentification "the particular telephone or telegraph line, or other telecommunica-
tion or radio communication carrier or channel from which the information is to be
obtained and the purpose thereof." ORE. R v. STAT. § 141.720(4) (1963). Prompt
execution and new probable cause for extension are avoided by the statute's use of a
sixty-day maximum period, § 141.720(6), thus providing for a "series" of searches
on a single showing of probable cause. See the text accompanying note 66 supra.




two unsatisfactory. The provision in Oregon's statute enunciating the
termination date requirement, is as follows:
Any officer who knowingly proceeds under an order which has
expired and has not been renewed .. .is deemed to act without
authority... and shall be subject to the penalties provided .. .as
though he had never obtained any such order or warrant.115
This provision fails to meet the requisite termination date because
the procedures upon which it relies, namely those of particularity
and prompt execution, are in themselves insufficient.
As to return on the warrant, judicial control is apparently extended
to the fruits of the search 1 6 and seizure by a provision stating that:
"No person having custody of any records maintained under [the
Oregon statute] ... shall disclose or release any materials or informa-
tion contained therein except upon written order of the court.""17
In review, this statute does not fulfill the Berger tests of particularity,
prompt execution and termination date, even though it apparently
suffices in the areas of special circumstances and return on the war-
rant requirements. Thus, if electronic surveillance is determined
possible under the fourth amendment, Oregon will need additional
safeguards to utilize this form of crime detection.
Massachusetts
The Massachusetts provision for electronic surveillance"18 also is
wanting in adequate constitutional safeguards. The statute requires
115 ORE. REv. STAT. § 141.730 (1963).
116 This construction of ORE. R y. STAT. § 141.740 (1963) is charitable, and thus
any conclusion in favor of the provision is qualified. The critical words involved are
"any records" as well as "any materials or information' and in this instance are
interpreted to include the fruits of the search as well as the material involved in the
application for the order. A contrary interpretation would render the provision in-
sufficient under the Berger decision.
117 ORE. RMv. STAT. § 141.740 (1963).
118 MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 272 § 99 (Supp. 1966). Eavesdropping; use of devices;
wire tapping: Court's order
Whoever, except in accordance with an order issued as provided herein,
secretly or without the consent of either a sender or receiver, overhears, or
attempts secretly, or without the consent of either a sender or receiver, to over-
hear, or to aid, authorize, employ, procure, or permit, or to have any other
person secretly, or without the consent of either a sender or receiver, to over-
hear any spoken words at any place by using any electronic recording device, or
a wireless tap or electronic tap, or however otherwise described, or any
similar device or arrangement, or by tapping any wire to intercept telephone
communications, shall be guilty of the crime of eavesdropping and shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than two years or by a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars, or both.
Such order may be issued and shall be signed by any justice of the supreme
judicial or superior court upon application of the attorney general or a district
attorney for the district verified by his oath or affirmation that there are reason-
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a statement of the purpose of the surveillance and a description of the
location and identity of person or persons whose conversations are to
be overheard, as well as the identity of persons authorized to overhear
and intercept the communications. Additionally, in the case of tele-
phonic interception, the statute necessitates identification of the tele-
phone line to be tapped, if such information is known. A three-month
maximum operation of the warrant is permitted, going beyond New
York's invalid sixty-day period, and like New York, an extension can
be granted upon a mere showing that such would be in the "public
interest."" 9 From the foregoing it is readily apparent that the suf-
ficiency of the Massachusetts' legislation is highly questionable. The
statute fails to require particular description of the specific crime
involved, and it may be lacking in an adequate delineation of the
relevant communications. Furthermore, an extension of the search is
allowed beyond the limits which have already been determined im-
permissible. The statute has no termination date provision, no requi-
site showing of "special facts" to waive notice of the search, and
able grounds to believe that evidence of crime may thus be obtained. The
finding by a judge or justice that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
evidence of crime may thus be obtained shall be final and not subject to review.
Said order shall describe or identify (1) the purpose thereof; (2) the location
of and the person or persons who are to be so overheard or whose commu-
nications are to be so intercepted if known; (3) if telephone communications
are to be so intercepted the telephone lines if known; (4) the person or persons
who are authorized to so overhear or intercept, or the person or persons under
whose supervision such overhearing or interception is to be conducted.
In connection with the issuance of such an order, the justice may examine
on oath the applicant and any other witness he may produce, for the purpose
of satisfying himself of the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that
evidence of crime may be thus obtained. The finding by a judge or justice
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of crime may thus be
obtained shall be final and not subject to review. Any such order shall be
effective for the time specified therein, but not for a period of more than three
months, unless extended or renewed by the justice who signed and issued the
original order, upon satisfying himself that such extension or renewal is in
the public interest. Any such order, together with the papers upon which the
application was based, shall be delivered to and retained by the applicant as
authority for such interception or directing such overhearing or interception
of the telephone communications transmitted over the instrument or instru.
ments described. A true copy of such order shall at all times be retained
personally by the judge or justice issuing the same. In case of emergency and
when no such justice is available, the attorney general or the district attorney
for the district may issue such order, but within seventy-two hours thereafter
the said attorney general or district attorney upon oath or affirmation setting
forth all the facts, shall apply to a justice of the supreme judicial or superior
court for a court order to issue validating the acts of said attorney general or
district attorney. If the court refuses, after hearing, to validate such prior order
of the attorney general or district attorney, said prior order shall cease to be
effective, and no further action thereunder may be taken.
12o This provision, standing alone, is sufficient to invalidate the Massachusetts
statute under Berger for the reason that, like the New York statute, it provides the
equivalent of a series of searches and seizures based upon a single showing of probable
cause. Additionally, like New York, Oregon and Nevada, Massachusetts requires no
new showing of probable cause for extensions of the original order.
NOTES
therefore it would be unconstitutional under the guidelines estab-
lished in Berger.
Maryland
Electronic search under Maryland legislation 20 comes nearest to
satisfying the Berger test of constitutionality. The primary difference
between Maryland's statute and the others previously considered is
that, on its face, it does not demonstrate noncompliance with the
Court's guidelines. Under this statute it must appear to a duly author-
120 AID. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A (Supp. 1966): Use to overhear or record
private conversation.
(a) Use without consent or knowledge prohibited.-It is unlawful for any
person in this State to use any electronic device or other device or equipment
of any type whatsoever in such manner as to overhear or record any part of
the conversation or words spoken to or by any person in private conversation
without the knowledge or consent, expressed or implied, of that other person.
(b) Prevention of crime or apprehension of criminal--Petition for ex parte
order authorizing use.-However, if it shall appear to a duly authorized public
law enforcement officer of this State that a crime has been, or is being, or is
about to be committed, and that the use of such electronic devices are required
to prevent the commission of the said crime, or to apprehend the persons who
shall have committed it, then the law enforcement officer or officers shall sub-
mit to the State's attorney of the county or of Baltimore City the evidence upon
which the said law enforcement officer bases his contention that an ex parte
order authorizing the use of the said electronic devices is necessary; and if it
shall appear to the said State's attorney that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed or is being committed or may be
committed then the said State's attorney shall apply to any of the judges of
the circuit court of the county or of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, by
means of a formal ex parte petition for the issuance of an order authorizing
the use of the said electronic devices or equipment, and shall make oath or
affirm in the said petition that there is probable cause to believe that a crime
may be, or is being, or has been committed and shall state the facts upon
which said probable cause is based, and further, that the use of the said
electronic devices or equipment is necessary in order to prevent the commission
of, or to secure evidence of the commission of such crime. In such case the
affiant shall identify, with reasonable particularity, the device or devices to be
used, the place or places where they are to be used, the person or persons
whose conversation is to be intercepted, the crime or crimes which are suspected
to have been, or about to be committed, and that the evidence thus obtained
will be used solely in connection with an investigation or prosecution of the
said crimes before any such ex parte order shall be issued. The applicant must
state whether any prior application has been made in the same matter and if
such prior application exists the applicant shall disclose the present status
thereof.
(c) Same-Issuance of order; duration; disposition.-The judge of the
circuit court of the county or of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City shall
satisfy himself that the facts stated in the petition indicate that there is
probable cause for the issuance of the said order. Such ex parte order shall be
effective for the time specified in the order, but for not more than thirty days
unless extended or renewed by the judge, upon proper petition meeting the
same requirements as the original petition. Any ex parte order so issued shall
be retained by the applicant as authority for the use of the electronic device
or equipment therein set out and the interception of the conversation sought to
be intercepted. A true copy of such order, together with any exhibits submitted
with the petition shall be sealed and filed with the clerk of the court in which
the order is issued, at the time of its issuance, provided, however, that such
order shall be available to persons in interest after arrest, upon order of the
court.
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ized law enforcement officer that a crime "has been, or is being, or is
about to be committed," and that the use of electronic devices is
required either to prevent the commission of the crime or to appre-
hend those who have committed it. The law enforcement officer must
then convince the state's attorney of these facts, whereupon the attor-
ney applies to the court for an ex parte eavesdropping warrant. In
turn, the Court must be satisfied that "probable cause" existed to
believe the particular crimes have been, are being, or are about to be
committed.
Clearly, Maryland has avoided the quandary as to the relationship
between the terms "reasonable ground" and "probable cause" by
expressly using the latter. Moreover, it satisfies the Berger requisite
of showing particular facts so as to permit the waiving of notice to
the person upon whom the search is focused. 121 By limiting the
maximum duration of the surveillance to thirty days, the Maryland
statute may provide for prompt execution. However, an unequivocal
statement of validity cannot be offered, since the Court in Berger
merely indicated that a period of sixty days is too long, not that a
thirty-day period is an acceptable limit.12 2 The statute is also unique
since it is the only one that directs an extension of the original order
to be based upon a "proper petition meeting the same requirements
as the original petition."'
12 3
The next question is central to the relationship between electronic
surveillance and the requirements of the fourth amendment: does
the Maryland statute describe with sufficient particularity the place
to be searched and the thing to be seized? It is necessary in the
application for such an order to identify,
with reasonable particularity, the device or devices to be used, the
place or places where they are to be used, the person or persons
whose conversation is to be intercepted, the crime or crimes which
are suspected to have been, or about to be committed, and [to cer-
121 -[T]he State's attorney shall . . . affirm in the said petition that . . . use of the
said electronic devices or equipment is necessary in order to prevent the commission of,
or to secure evidence of the commission of such crime .... " MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 125A(b) (Supp. 1966) (emphasis added). The same section also provides that, "it
shall appear to a duly authorized public law enforcement officer of this State that...
the use of such electronic devices are required to prevent the commission of the said
crime, or to apprehend the persons who shall have committed it .... "
122 It is submitted, however, that since length was the motivating factor in the
objection, Maryland will fare better in this regard than did New York. See 388 U.S.
at 59.
123 M . ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A(c) (Supp. 1966).
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tify] that the evidence thus obtained will be used solely in con-
nection with an investigation or prosecution of the said crimes
before any such ex parte order shall be issued.
124
Whether the Maryland statute provides sufficient particularity in
the warrant, and whether such particularity is possible in any statute,
could best be ascertained by further inquiry into what is capable of
identification and description that is not identified and described by
the Maryland statute. The statute requires description of the device,
the place in which it is used, the person or persons at which such use
is directed, and the crime or crimes which it seeks to uncover. It is
offered that these requirements render as complete a picture as is
possible with regard to a future conversation in which there is prob-
able cause to believe that evidence of a crime will arise, and therefore
would provide the necessary particularity in a constitutional inter-
pretation allowing electronic surveillance.
What then is the fate of the Maryland statute with respect to the
remaining Berger requirements of termination date and return on the
warrant? Since the terms are not specifically mentioned in the statute,
it is necessary to determine whether they exist functionally or by im-
plication. The function of both the termination date and return of
the warrant requirements is to limit the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant.125 The former limits his discretion in the scope
of the search and seizure, the latter limits his use of the product.
Maryland's statute satisfies both of these goals by restricting the ad-
mission of evidence gained pursuant to the warrant to that relevant
to the specified crime.126 The phrase "pursuant to the warrant," as
used in this interpretation, implies satisfaction of the other safe-
guards of the statute and assumes their constitutional sufficiency as
demonstrated above. The officer's discretion in the scope of the
search and seizure could take two forms in an electronic surveillance
-he could, because of a desire to hear more incriminating statements,
continue to eavesdrop after hearing the relevant conversation, or he
could continue in the hope of hearing incrimination of a different
type. Both are inherently restricted by the thirty-day maximum time
124 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A(b) (Supp. 1966).
125 For a general reference to the mechanics of return on the warrant, see material
cited in note 73 supra.
126 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A(b) (Supp. 1966). "[T]he evidence thus
obtained will be used solely in connection with an investigation or prosecution of the
said crimes .... "
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limit-_on the surveillanice, and the latter is further limited by the
admigsion of evidence relevant only to the crime specifically men-
tioned in the warrant. It is therefore submitted that of all the statutes
considered, Maryland alone approximates the requirements of the
Berger decision. This is not to say, however, that a more satisfactory
statute cannot be drafted to meet the additional safeguards of Berger,
particularly in the areas of termination date and return on the war-
rant provisions, found only by implication in the Maryland statute.
III. CONCLUSION
The history of the law of eavesdropping has been traced to its
latest development in Berger v. New York. An attempt has been
made to establish the effect of the decision on electronic surveillance.
The central question presented by the decision is concerned with the
possibility that the Court may, by implication, have established safe-'
guards for electronic surveillance that are impossible to meet. This
impossibility specifically concerns the fourth amendment requirement
that the object of a search be particularly described, a feat uniquely
difficult with conversations that are to occur sometime in the future.
If the terms "search" and "seizure" are construed in a manner con-
sistent with the selective use of parts of a conversation, and the rights
of the accused are additionally protected by (1) procedures requiring
showing of probable cause for belief that a particular crime has been
or will be committed; (2) a showing of special circumstances necessi-
tating the use of electronic devices; (3) prompt execution; (4) a
demonstration of new probable cause for extensions of the order; and
(5) a return on the order provision limiting the use of any conversa-
tions, a valid electronic surveillance statute could conceivably exist.
Proceeding on the assumption that such surveillance is possible under
the fourth amendment, the statutes of six states were examined to see
whether they otherwise met the requirements of Berger. Only one,
that of Maryland, appears to meet the test, and then by implication
in the areas of the termination date and return on the warrant. The
remaining question, of couise, concerns the validity of the assumption
that electronic surveillance is possible and therefore consistent with
the requirements of the fourth amendment. It is postulated that the
offered interpretation of the terms "search" and "seizure," taken in
conjunction with the other safeguards promulgated in Berger, render





Shortly after the completion of this note, the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Katz v. United States.12 7 The majority
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Stewart, presents succinct constitu-
tional interpretations that have been foreshadowed by previous deci-
sions.
In overturning the conviction of the petitioner, the Court reasoned
that the protection of the fourth amendment extends to people rather
than places, and refused to speak in terms of "constitutionally pro-
tected" areas. Consequently, the trespass doctrine enunciated in the
Olmstead and Goldman opinions-that lack of physical penetration
foreclosed fourth amendment considerations-was deemed not con-
trolling in the present analysis of constitutional protection afforded
the defendant. Rather, that which an individual desires to preserve
as private was held to be significant. Thus, although the defendant
in Katz could not reasonably expect his presence in a public telephone
booth to be exempt from public view, he could expect that his con-
versation remain inaccessible to others. 28
The most important aspect of Katz was the Court's determination
that, even though the specific search and seizure before it was viola-
tive of the fourth amendment, electronic surveillance can be consti-
tutionally conducted. Noting that the procedure in the instant case
failed to impose a neutral and detached authority between the police
and public, i.e., the search was conducted without a judicial order,
the Court stated:
[I]t is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that
a duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for such
investigation, specifically informed of the basis on which it was to
proceed, and dearly appraised of the precise intrusion it would en-
tail, could constitutionally have authorized [the search and seizure]
with appropriate safeguards .... 129
The Katz decision, consistent with the Osborn-Berger rationale,
enunciates the constitutional propriety of electronic surveillance when
conducted according to the Berger guidelines. This being so, critical
evaluation of those existing statutes that purport to authorize such
surveillance is rendered all the more pertinent.
JAMES W. STREET & MICHAEL T. THORSNES
127 36 U.S.L.W. 4080 (U.S. Dec. 18, 1967). For a brief discussion of the Katz
facts see text accompanying note 85 supra.
128 Id. at 4081.
129 Id. at 4082.
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